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Abstract In 2003 the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
published estimates of macro-economic indicators for 2002 of the economy of Palestine. 
WB used a micro-founded recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model, calibrated on the 1998 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Palestine, to which 
shocks were applied, whereas IMF based its estimates on a macro-founded income-
expenditure model relying on more recent data. It turned out that there were substantial 
differences: the estimate by WB of the real Gross National Income (at 1998 prices) was 
25% less than the corresponding figure calculated by IMF. This huge difference is not 
only relevant for a full understanding of the economic consequences of the intifada, but 
also for the size of the international community intervention. In this paper we propose 
our own evaluation with the help of a static CGE model, based on the 1998 SAM and the 
so-called intifada shock derived from data of WB, that we constructed for the analysis of 
some forms of emergency assistance in a previous article. It turns out that our estimates, 
based on an entirely different methodology, are remarkably close to those of IMF.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The most recent years of the Palestinian history, those of the second intifada, have 
witnessed a dramatic decline in all Palestinian economic and social indicators. Since 
September 2000, when the violent confrontations started, conditions for a normal life 
have nearly disappeared and the economic situation has steadily disintegrated. 
 
Using a poverty line of US$ 2.1 per day the World Bank (2003b, pp. i-xiv) estimated the 
poverty in Palestine in 1998 at 23.2% of the population, whereas by the end of 2002 the 
Bank estimated the poverty to have risen to 59 percent. The unemployment rate that 
amounted to 16.2% in 1998 rose to 37% at the end of 2002. The overall GNI losses 
have reached US$ 5.2 billion during the first twenty-seven months of intifada, which is 
more than the GNI in 1998 or in 1999 (US$ 5.1 billion). 
 
Two main causes of the Palestinian economic crisis are closure, namely the imposition 
of restrictions on the movement of goods and people across borders and within 
Palestine, and the destruction of capital. In September 2000 the Bank estimated the 
number of Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements at 128,000, while the 
estimate for end 2002 was about 32,000. The physical damage resulting from the 
conflict was estimated to be US$ 305 million by the end of 2001 and US$ 930 million by 
the end of 2002. As a result of damage and of the fall in investment, the real productive 
capital stock declined by US$ 1.7 billion between 1999 and 2002. 
 
It is clear, in some way even obvious, that an already fragile economy has been hit very 
hard by the conflict. However, there is no consensus on the extent and the order of 
magnitude by which the Palestinian economy has suffered during the last years of 
conflict. Specifically, we will see in the next section that the evaluations coming from the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2003a, 2003b and 2003c) are substantially different from 
those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2003). Just to anticipate one figure, 
according to the WB the GNI in 2002 is 25% less than the corresponding figure 
calculated by the IMF. It goes without saying that such a huge difference is relevant not 
only to a full understanding of the economic consequences of the conflict, but arguably 
to the size of the international community intervention as well. This is the reason why in 
this paper we try to propose our own evaluation of the economic consequences of the 
conflict, with the help of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated on the 
social accounting matrix (SAM) of 1998, a part of which has been presented in  
appendix 1of Missaglia and de Boer (2004).  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the different 
assessments proposed by international agencies. In section 3 we provide a description 
of the model used for our own evaluation. Section 4 describes what we called the 
“intifada shock”, i.e. the set of shocks the Palestinian economy has suffered as a 
consequence of the violent confrontations started in September 2000. Section 5  
illustrates the results and compares them with those obtained by the IMF.    
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2. Assessments by international agencies 
 
Before comparing the significantly different assessments proposed by the World Bank 
and the IMF (table 2.8), let us have a look at how these different figures are arrived at. 
 
2.1. Assessment by the World Bank 
 
The estimates of the World Bank are based on “….a quant itative model which describes 
the economic relations between households, producers, government and the rest of the 
world through a set of accounting and behavioral equations….” (cf. World Bank, 2003b, 
footnote 41). The description of this CGE model can be found in Astrup and Dessus 
(2001, 2002).  
 
The following tables are derived from the “Summary of Macroeconomic Trends and 
Projections” that has been published in World Bank (2003c) and contains the same data 
as published in table 7 of World Bank (2003b) but in more detail. 
 
In table 2.1 we calculate from the annual changes provided by World Bank (2003c) the 
CPI of 2002 based on 1998 = 1 and the compound real growth index of the components 
of GDP in NIS (1998 prices). 
 
Table 2.1. CPI and compound real growth index of the components of GDP 2002 
                 (NIS, prices 1998) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 CPI 2002 
(1998=1) 
Exchange rate 3.81    4.74  
CPI, annual change .056 .055 .027 .021 .057 1.169 
 
Real annual change 
(NIS, prices 1998) 
Compound real 
growth index 
2002 (1998=1) 
Private consumption .090 .075 -.056 -.155 -.148 .731 
Public consumption .070 .203 .310 -.021 -.006 1.534 
Total fixed investment .084 -.083 -.283 -.769 -.440 .085 
Exports .066 .023 -.088 -.134 -.243 .612 
Imports .074 .054 -.162 -.290 -.129 .546 
 
In table 2.2 we give the data on the components of GDP for 1998 in million US$ (World 
Bank, 2003c) and calculate the 1998 amounts in NIS based on the exchange rate given 
in table 2.1. From the data given in table 2.1 we take the compound real growth index 
2002 (1998 = 1) and the amounts in (real) NIS and in US$ easily follow. The real GDP of 
2002 in NIS is derived by taking the sum of the expenditure components and subtracting 
the imports. The nominal amounts are taken from World Bank (2003c), whereas the 
price indices easily follow. The price index of private consumption that we derive is, as it 
should be, equal to the CPI, derived by us in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.2 Estimate of the real components of GDP (in million US$ or million 
                NIS) and of the price indices 
 
 1998  2002 
 Nominal 
US$ 
Nominal 
 NIS 
Compound 
real 
growth 
index 
Real 
NIS 
Real 
US$ 
Nominal 
US$ 
Price 
index 
(1998=1) 
Private 
consumption 
4,014 15,293 .731 11,173 2,357 2,756 1.169 
Public 
consumption 
976 3,719 1.534 5,703 1,203 1,757 1.460 
Total fixed 
investment 
1,668 6,355 .085 541 114 119 1.044 
Exports 624 2,377 .612 1,454 307 345 1.125 
Imports 3,052 11,628 .546 6,351 1,340 1,581 1.180 
GDP 4,230 16,116  12,519 2,641 3,396 1.286 
 
In table 2.3 we give data taken from World Bank (2003c) and calculate the compound 
real growth indices per capita for 2002 (1998=1). 
 
Table 2.3  Population and compound real growth index per capita 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
Population, mid-
year (1,000) 
2,731    3,231  
 
Real annual change 
(NIS, prices 1998) 
Compound real 
growth index 
per capita 
GNI per capita .077 .039 -.075 -.232 -.234 .565 
GDP per capita .039 .031 -.053 -.195 -.225 .609 
  
In table 2.4 we estimate GNI and GDP using the compound real growth index per capita 
and the data on the population presented in table 2.3. The estimate of real net factor 
income (NFI) follows from subtracting real GDP from real GNI. The nominal amounts of 
GNI, GDP and net factor income are taken from World Bank (2003c). 
 
Table 2.4 Estimate of the real components of GNI (in million US$ or million 
                NIS) 
 1998 2002 
 Nominal 
US$ 
Nominal per  
capita NIS 
Compound     
real growth  
index per 
capita 
Real per  
capita NIS 
Real 
US$ 
Nominal 
US$ 
GNI 5,058 7,056 .565 3,990 2,719 3,768 
GDP 4,230 5,901 .609 3,595 2,450 3,396 
NFI 828 1,155   269 372 
 
It should be noted that the estimate of GDP reported in table 2.2 (2,641 million US$) is 
10.8% higher than the one reported in table 2.4 (2,450 million US$). 
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2.2. Assessment by the International Monetary Fund 
 
In June 2003, the PCBS published, with the technical assistance of the IMF, a set of 
annual national accounts statistics for the years 1994 to 2000 (IMF, 2003, p. 22). With 
the aid of an income-expenditure model the IMF estimated GNI and its components for 
the years 2001 and 2002. We quote from IMF (2003):  
 
Box 2.5. A simple Income-Expenditure Model to Estimate GDP Developments 
 
The income-expenditure model starts with the identity GDP equals Exports minus 
Imports plus Consumption plus Investment. Information on exports in 2001 can be 
obtained from the preliminary balance of payments (BOP) prepared by the PCBS and 
the PMA. For 2002, Israeli BOP figures are available, that identify Israeli imports from 
the “Palestinian Authority”, which is broadly equivalent to WBG excluding East 
Jerusalem in this context. According to trade statistics from the PCBS, about 90 percent 
of Palestinian exports go to Israel. Imports and private consumption are both assumed to 
be a linear function of private disposable income (PDI). PDI is equal to GNI less 
domestic taxes (available from ministry of finance data) plus transfers from abroad (for 
which some limited data is available from banks). GNI is equal to GDP plus net factor 
income from abroad, which is mostly labor income from Israel (estimates based on 
quarterly labor market survey). Public consumption is derived from the fiscal accounts 
(which are up to date). Investment is based on partial information on public investment 
from donors project financing and even more partial information on private investment in 
construction (based on indicators of cement imports and building permits). 
 
The model provides estimates for GDP and certain components in nominal terms. In 
order to derive GDP in real terms, each demand component is deflated. The most 
important component of the deflators is the CPI which is complemented by several other 
price series, such as oil prices and prices in Israel. Historically, the GDP deflator and the 
CPI index have in fact been very similar. 
 
In table 2.5 we make use of the fractions of GDP and of the nominal GDP figures 
reported by IMF (2003, table 2.2) to derive the components for 1998 and 2002. 
 
Table 2.5 GDP and GNI (current prices, million US$) 1998 and 2002 
 
 1998 2002 
 Fraction  Million US$ Fraction Million US$ 
Private consumption .997 4,245 1.247 3,709 
Public consumption .224 954 .343 1,020 
Private investment .264 1,124 .166 494 
Public investment .064 273 .035 104 
Change inventories  .023 98 0 0 
Exports .208 886 .139 413 
Imports .780 3,321 .930 2,766 
GDP 4,258 4,258 2,974 2,974 
Net factor income  .212 903 .145 431 
GNI 1.212 5,161 1.145 3,405 
Net current transfers .096 409 .589 1,752 
Gross disposable income 1.308 5,569 1.734 5,157 
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IMF (2003, table 2.1) gives the annual growth of GDP, GNI and CPI. In table 2.6 we use 
these figures in order to derive the GDP, GNI and, residually, the net factor income 
(NFI), all in millions US$, prices 1998 (recall from our table 2.5 that in 1998 the GNI was 
5,161 and the GDP 4,258 million US$). We present our findings in table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6 Estimate for 2002 of Real GNI, GDP, NFI (million US$, prices 1998) 
                 and CPI (base year 1998) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002   Million US$  
2002 (prices 1998) 
Real annual change (US$, prices 1998) Compound 
growth index 
2002 (1998 = 1) 
 
Real GNI .084 -.068 -.162 -.164 .708 3,653 
Real GDP .089 -.054 -.150 -.145 .749 3,188 
Real NFI      565 
CPI .055 .028 .012* .057 1.160  
* The World Bank reports a figure of .021 leading to a CPI of 1.169 in 2002. 
 
IMF (2003, table 2.3) reports that the index of real GDP of 2002 with respect to real GDP 
1997 = 100 is equal to .837. Since the index of real GDP in 1998 was equal to 118.8 and 
the nominal GDP in 1998 4,258, we calculate the real GDP in 2002:  
 
188,3
188.1
258,4837.
=
´
    
 
which is equal to the real GDP in 2002 reported in our table 2.6, as indeed it should be. 
 
Using the fractions that IMF (2003, table 2.3) reports for 2002, and using the figure of 
3,188 million US$, we arrive at table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7. Estimate of the real components of GDP 2002 
 
2002 
 Fraction Million US$* 
(prices 1998) 
Private consumption 1.041 3,956 
Public consumption .274 1,041 
Private investment .144 547 
Public investment .030 114 
Change inventories  0 0 
Exports .112 426 
Imports .762 2,986 
GDP .837 3,188 
* We balanced the figures to arrive at GDP=3,188 
 
It is puzzling that division of the nominal consumption of 3,709 (cf. our table 2.5) by the 
real consumption of 3,956 (cf. our table 2.7) does not lead to the CPI of 1.160 (cf. our 
table 2.6). 
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2.3. Comparison between the World Bank and the IMF 
 
In table 2.8 we summarize the assessment by the World Bank and the IMF presented in 
the two previous subsections, as well as their ratio: the assessment of the World Bank 
as fraction of the one by the IMF.   
 
Table 2.8* Comparison between the assessment by the World Bank and the IMF 
 
 1998 (million US$) 2002 (current prices, 
million US$) 
2002 (prices 1998, 
million US$) 
 WB IMF Ratio WB IMF Ratio WB IMF Ratio 
Private 
consumption 
4,014 4,245 .946 2,756 3,709 .743 2,357 3,956 .596 
Public 
consumption 
976 954 1.023 1,757 1,020 1.723 1,203 1,041 1.156 
Total fixed 
investment 
1,668 1,494 1.116 119 598 .199 114 661 .172 
Exports 624 886 .704 345 413 .835 307 426 .721 
Imports 3,052 3,321 .919 1,581 2,766 .572 1,340 2,896 .463 
GDP 4,230 4,258 .993 3,396 2,974 1.142 2,450 3,188 .769 
NFI 828 903 .917 372 431 .863 269 465 .578 
GNI 5,058 5,161 .980 3,768 3,405 1.107 2,719 3,653 .744 
* The ratio is the figure of the World Bank divided by the one of the IMF. 
  
The reader may easily notice that the differences between the two evaluations (2002, 
prices 1998) are relevant and worth stressing. In a sense, one should not be too much 
surprised: the WB predictions are based on a micro-founded, CGE model, whereas the 
IMF’s are based on a macro, income-expenditure model; the WB based its study on a 
SAM of 1998, whereas the IMF study relies on some more recent data (see Box 2.5). It 
would not make any sense to assert that one model is better than the other, since they 
are usually employed for different purposes. What we want to stress here is the fact that 
the IMF macro figures are based on more recently available data and thus are likely to 
describe more appropriately the cost of the conflict. Is it possible to get closer to those 
(IMF) figures using some analytical tool which is closer to the richer, micro-founded kind 
of model used by the World Bank? This is the question we try to answer in the rest of 
this paper. 
 
3. Description of the model 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the model we have five economic agents: eight producers, one household, a bank that 
allocates savings over investments, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the rest of the 
world (RoW). In their appendix 2 Missaglia and de Boer (2004) present the glossary of 
symbols and in their appendix 3 the equations of the model. 
3.2. The producers  
Intermediate inputs are combined into the intermediates by means of a Leontief 
technology, whereas capital and labor are combined into value added by means of a 
CES technology. Both aggregates are, using the Leontief assumption, combined into  
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the supply of the domestically produced commodity. This commodity is transformed via a 
CET function into an export commodity and into a domestic commodity supplied to the 
domestic market. This commodity is combined with imports to produce the composite 
commodity. To that end we adopt the Armington assumption by using a CES functional 
form. This commodity is either used in the production process (intermediate demand) or 
for final purposes: consumption, consumption of the PA and investment.  
3.3. The household 
The household owns the capital, receives transfers from the PA and from the rest of the 
world, and it disposes of a time endowment. The household is assumed to maximize its 
utility in two stages: in the first one it allocates its time endowment over labor supply and 
leisure. We allow for unemployment so that the labor demand is smaller than the labor 
supply. We assume that the unemployed do not receive unemployment benefits. 
In the model we use the unemployment theory delineated in the migration literature by 
Harris and Todaro (1970) to describe the wage gap between rural and urban jobs. 
Compared to the modified version proposed by Ruppert Bulmer (2001), we stay closer to 
the original Harris-Todaro model. The core of the theory is described by the following 
arbitrage condition (acting as a wage curve): 
 
PLF.b).
UNEMPLF
LF
(PL
+
=  
 
The wage rate paid by Palestinian firms to Palestinian workers, PL, must be equal, in 
equilibrium, to the expected wage rate of the Palestinian workers employed in Israel or in 
the settlements. The latter is equal to the wage rate prevailing in Israel and the 
settlements, PLF, multiplied by the probability of getting a job in Israel or in the 
settlements and a factor b. The probability of getting a job in Israel or in the settlements 
is simply given by the ratio of the Palestinian workers actually employed in Israel or in 
the settlements (LF) to the workers who look for a job there: those who manage (LF) and 
those who do not (UNEMP). The factor b is interpreted to be the inverse of the 
probability of getting a job in Palestine. Then, the arbitrage condition states nothing but 
the equality between two expected wages: 
 
P (Job in Palestine).PL = P (Job in Israel or in the settlements).PLF 
 
All sources of income (capital, transfers and wages earned in Israel, the settlements and 
Palestine) together yield the household income. 
 
The household pays income taxes and saves a fixed fraction out of its income after 
taxes. Subtracting taxes and savings from income yields the budget that it devotes to the 
purchase of commodities. In the second stage the household maximizes a utility 
function, with the consumption of these commodities as arguments, subject to its budget 
constraint. For both stages we use a Linear Expenditure System (LES). 
 
3.4. The Palestinian Authority (PA) 
 
The PA derives its revenues from two sources: taxes (on imports, capital, labor, 
consumption commodities and on household’s income) and foreign aid. These revenues 
are spent on transfers, savings and on other expenditures. With respect to the latter we 
assume that the PA maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function with its purchases of the 
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two commodities “Private Services” and “Public Services” as arguments subject to the 
expenditure constraint. 
 
3.5. The bank 
 
The household savings, the PA savings and the foreign savings are allocated over the 
investment demand for the commodities. To that end the bank is assumed to maximize a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to the constraint that savings are equal to total 
investments.  
 
3.6. The rest of the world 
 
For the Palestinian economy, the RoW basically coincides with Israel and its 
settlements, at least as far as foreign trade is considered. In 1998, 76 percent of imports  
and 96 percent of exports came from and were directed toward Israel and its settlements 
(Astrup and Dessus, 2001). Obviously, the picture is different if one looks at foreign aid 
disbursements. For instance, out of a total of US$ 1.1 billion by the end of 2002, US$ 
840 million came from Arab League countries and US$ 230 million from the EU (World 
Bank, 2003a). 
Palestine earns revenues from the RoW via exports and other sources: foreign aid 
accruing to the PA, remittances from the workers employed in Israel or in the 
settlements, foreign transfers directly accruing to the households and foreign savings, 
i.e. the deficit in the current account balance. These revenues are spent on imports of 
goods. 
 
Imports and exports are treated in a rather standard way, through, respectively, an 
Armington-CES and a CET assumption. 
 
4. The 1998 Social Accounting Matrix and the counterfactual SAM  
     
4.1. The 1998 SAM 
 
The CGE model used in this paper is calibrated around the SAM constructed by the 
World Bank for 1998. Compared to this original version, we aggregate the several 
sectors and sub-sectors included in it to eight main sectors: Food, Other Agriculture, 
Manufacturing, Construction, Transport, Trade, Private Services and Public Services, 
each of them producing one good. The food sector is an aggregation of the food 
producing agricultural activities and of those activities that, although belonging to the 
Manufacturing sector in the SAM, produce food items as well (for instance the "food and 
beverages" activity). For more details we refer to section 2.1 of Missaglia and de Boer 
(2004). 
 
4.2. The counterfactual SAM 
 
We built a "counterfactual" SAM by giving a big "intifada shock" to the 1998 benchmark:  
 
1. A reduction in the capital stock  
 
According to World Bank (2003a), physical damages resulting from the conflict (private 
and public buildings, infrastructure, productive trees and soils, etc.) amounted to 14% of 
1998 GNI by the end of August 2002, a huge reduction in the productive capital stock. 
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But what we are mainly interested in is the reduction in capital income rather than in 
capital stock. Missaglia and de Boer (2004) infer that capital income decreased by at 
least 30%. 
 
2. A dramatic fall in the level of labor income earned in Israel or in the settlements  
 
According to World Bank (2003a), from September 2000 to the end of 2002, the number 
of permits was reduced from 128,000 to 32,000. It would make sense to assume a 75% 
reduction in this source of income, but, taking into consideration the rather large number 
of Palestinians who manage to cross into Israel or its settlements illegally, we have given 
this variable a 50% shock. 
 
3. An increase in donors' disbursements 
 
According to World Bank staff calculations (2003a), total disbursements increased from 
around US$ 400 million to around US$ 1.1 billion. 
 
4. A reduction in the household’s propensity to save by 50% 
 
5. A reduction in PA saving by 50%  
 
It must be noted that one of the main reasons of this reduction is the withholding of 
Israel’s transfers to the PA concerning the tax revenue collected by the former on behalf 
of the latter. 
 
6. An increase in the transfers paid by the PA to the households and in the labor  
    subsidies handed out to the "Public Services" sector 
 
We assumed that 90% of the increase in foreign aid was used by the PA to fund social 
transfers to the households, whereas the remaining percentage was devoted to the 
payment of labor subsidies which is a convenient way of modeling the intervention of the 
PA aimed at absorbing, however partially, the labor market shock suffered by the 
Palestinian economy (see Missaglia and de Boer,2004). 
 
7. An increase in the labor force  
 
According to the PCBS data (www.pcbs.org), the labor force growth was around 8%.  
 
8. An increase in the parameter b that describes the inverse of the probability of getting  
   a job in Palestine  
 
Its calibrated 1998 value turned out to be 1.178 (equivalent to a probability of getting a 
job in Palestine of 85%); we multiplied it by 2.5 (equivalent to a 34% probability of getting 
a job in Palestine).  
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5. Results and comparison 
 
In the following table we summarize our results (DBM) and compare them to those of the 
IMF. 
 
Table 2.9* Comparison between DBM and the IMF 
 
 1998 (million US$) 2002 (prices 1998, million US$) 
 DBM IMF Ratio DBM IMF Ratio 
Private consumption 3,977 4,245 .937 3,658 3,956 .925 
Public consumption 976 954 1.023 1,130 1,041 1.085 
Total fixed investment 1,675 1,494 1.121 997 661 1.508 
Exports 729 886 .823 467 426 1.096 
Imports 3,053 3,321 .919 2,831 2,896 .978 
GDP 4,304 4,258 1.011 3,421 3,188 1.073 
NFI 779 903 .863 390 465 .839 
GNI 5,083 5,161 .985 3,811 3,653 1.043 
* The ratio is the figure of MDB divided by the one of the IMF. 
 
As the reader may easily see from the column “2002….”, the main difference between 
our results (DBM) and the IMF results concerns total fixed investment, which is larger in 
DBM, and private consumption, which is lower in DBM. One reasonable explanation for 
this difference can be found in the role played in our model by the “Construction” sector. 
Indeed, “in the Palestinian economy more than half of total investment is concentrated 
into unproductive investment, such as residential building…” (Astrup and Dessus, 2002, 
p.18). This kind of investment (or at least a part of it: its annual equivalent) should be 
assimilated, from the point of view of its economic impact, to consumption, something 
that does not add anything to the productive capacity of the economy. However, in the 
SAM we used to calibrate the model almost the whole output of the “Construction” sector 
is classified as “investment”. This may explain the origin of the observed difference. The 
other items of DBM and IMF are extremely close to each other, which means that the 
“intifada shock” we imposed on the model is reasonable and, arguably, the modeling 
itself makes sense.  
 
Consequently, it turns out that it is possible to get closer to the IMF figures using our 
model which is closer to the richer, micro-founded model used by the World Bank.  
 
The conviction that our model can be profitably used to simulate, for instance, the impact 
of different foreign assistance policies and eventually other policy shocks (see Missaglia 
and de Boer, 2004) has been reinforced by the outcomes of this study.   
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